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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the constitutional order that underlies 
Anishinaabe law.1 The focus is not on Anishinaabe law itself; an undistorted understanding of 
Anishinaabe law is impossible without first understanding the underlying constitutional order 
that gives rise to Anishinaabe law. By “constitutional order”, we do not mean a combination of 
founding documents and conventions; those refer to only one particular type of constitutional 
order.2  Instead, we mean a framework for how a people constitutes itself as a political 
community.3 All legal systems, including Canadian law, are grounded in a particular 
constitutional order. Constitutional orders, in turn, are grounded in a people’s fundamental 
beliefs about the nature of reality, including their ontology, cosmology, and epistemology.4 An 
                                                 
1 The Anishinaabe nation is located “around the upper Great Lakes and on the prairies to the north-east of the lakes”: 
John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 77. 
2 Aaron Mills, “The Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today” (2016) 61:4 McGill LJ 
847 at 855, note 14 [Mills, “Lifeworlds”]. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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attempt to engage with a foreign legal system—including an Indigenous legal system such as 
Anishinaabe law—without first comprehending that law’s underlying constitutional order will 
result in misunderstandings and a distorted conception of the law. For those of us enculturated 
within a western liberal democratic worldview, to avoid inadvertently imposing our own 
particular ontological, cosmological, and epistemological—and eventually constitutional—
assumptions onto Anishinaabe law, we must first learn to step outside of our own constitutional 
order and begin to operate from within an Anishinaabe constitutional order. 
 
The account of an Anishinaabe constitutional order presented here draws from Aaron 
Mills’ research for his doctoral dissertation, and in particular from his article entitled “The 
Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today”.5 Consistent with the 
discussion of Anishinaabe epistemology below, Mills asserts that his primary teacher of 
Anishinaabe law is his grandmother, Bessie Mainville of Couchiching First Nation, but that he 
learns much also from community members and elders from Couchiching and other nearby 
Anishinaabe communities, and from the land.      
 
Section 2 below begins with a brief sketch of an Anishinaabe epistemology (way of 
knowing and learning). A comprehensive account of Anishinaabe ontology, cosmology, and 
epistemology is beyond the scope of this chapter. The focus is on epistemology because insofar 
as this chapter aims to teach readers about an Anishinaabe constitutional order, it incorporates 
some aspects of an Anishinaabe epistemology. Section 3 discusses three aadizookaanan,6 or 
stories, which reflect an Anishinaabe constitutional order. Section 4 explains Mills’s tree model 
of legality and compares an Anishinaabe constitutional order to a liberal constitutional order. 
Section 5 provides a fact scenario depicting various legal issues affecting a hypothetical 
Anishinaabe community, the Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation. Finally, section 6 applies the 
constitutional order outlined in sections 3 and 4 to the hypothetical fact scenario. This is not a 
comprehensive legal analysis of the fact scenario, as this chapter does not purport to detail 
Anishinaabe law. Rather, section 6 answers the question: How does an Anishinaabe 
constitutional order inform the Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation decision-making process 
regarding the mining company’s proposal? 
 
2. Anishinaabe Epistemology 
 
To appreciate the distinctive features of an Anishinaabe epistemology, it is helpful to 
contrast it with a western epistemology, including a western conception of knowledge and truth.7  
                                                 
5 Ibid.  Mills wishes to note his sincere appreciation for the hard work of Drake and Muthusamipillai.  While the 
framework is Mills’s creation, the majority of the work of explaining and applying it in this chapter was undertaken 
by Drake and Muthusamipillai.   
6 Aadizookaanan (pl); aadizookaan (sg); pronounced ah-di-zoh-kah-nun, aadizookaanan are Anishinaabe sacred 
stories and/or legends from time immemorial. Often, the term aadizookaanan is used interchangeably with stories 
and legends. In this analysis, we will use the term interchangeably with stories.  Please understand therefore that 
when we write “stories”, we mean to exclude dibaajimowinan, which are personal, family, and community 
narratives from time memorial.   
7 This section is reproduced with minor adaptations from Karen Drake, “Finding a Path to Reconciliation: 
Mandatory Indigenous Law, Anishinaabe Pedagogy, and Academic Freedom” (2017) 95:1 Can Bar Rev 
(forthcoming), copyright © 2017 by Karen Drake. 
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Despite philosophical debates, the standard western conception of truth, the one accepted 
for practical purposes, is that truth is objective and absolute. True facts exist in the world 
independently of knowers. The scientific method is premised on this conception; by repeatedly 
refining our theories, we will get ever closer to the truth. The corresponding pedagogy has been 
described by Paulo Freire as the banking system of education.8 Students, who lack knowledge, 
are empty vessels that can be filled with knowledge by passively receiving deposits of true facts 
from a teacher.9 According to this epistemology, teachers are authorities who bestow knowledge 
by transferring true facts.10 Standard western teaching methods, such as the lecture, reflect these 
assumptions. A lecturer is an authority, occupying a privileged place in the room, usually at the 
front and elevated by standing while students sit; the lecturer states true facts which students 
receive. Once students are able to accurately repeat, or perhaps apply, the true facts, then they 
too have knowledge.  
 
This picture is complicated somewhat by the use of the Socratic method within some 
courses at some law schools in Canada. The Socratic method eschews the passivity of the 
banking system of education, but it still assumes the objectivity of truth. Although law students 
must engage actively in response to Socratic questioning, the answers they give are still 
objectively correct or incorrect; their answers either accurately reflect the facts, issues, holding, 
and ratio of the case in question, or they do not. 
 
We can contrast this with an Anishinaabe conception of knowledge and truth. Lana Ray 
and Paul Nicholas Cormier describe an Anishinaabe epistemology with the story, “Nanaboozhoo 
and the Maple Trees”: 
 
A long time ago when the world was new, Gitche Manitou made things  
so that life was very easy for the people. There were plenty of animals,  
good weather, and the maple trees were filled with thick, sweet syrup;  
they just had to break off a twig and collect it as it dropped off. 
Nanaboozhoo went to go see his friends the Anishinaabe, but when he 
arrived there was no one around – they were not fishing, working in the 
fields, or gathering berries. Nanaboozhoo finally found them in a grove 
of maple trees, lying on their backs with their mouths open, letting the 
maple syrup drip into their mouths. 
 
Upon seeing this, Nanaboozhoo said, “This will not do.” He went down 
to the river and took a big basket made of birch bark, bringing back many 
buckets of water. He went to the top of the maple trees and poured the 
water in so that it thinned out, making the syrup thin and watery and just 
barely sweet to the taste. “This is how it will be from now on”, he said. 
“No longer will syrup drip from the maple trees. Now there will be only 
watery sap. When people want to make maple syrup they will have to 
                                                 
8 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) at 72. 
9 Freire, ibid at 72; see also Marie Battiste, Decolonizing Education: Nourishing the Learning Spirit (Saskatoon: 
Purich Publishing Ltd, 2013) at 106. 
10 Freire, supra note 8 at 72. 
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gather many buckets full of the sap in the birch bark baskets like mine. 
They will have to gather wood and make fires to heat the stones to drop 
into the baskets. They will have to boil the water with the heated stones 
for a long time to make even a little maple syrup.”11 
 
Ray and Cormier explain that the thick maple syrup is akin to knowledge,12 and that 
western teaching and learning methods, such as being spoon fed facts from a PowerPoint slide or 
from a book, are akin to lying on the ground and letting maple syrup drip into one’s mouth.13 The 
process of turning the sap into syrup represents Anishinaabe knowledge.14 Just as it takes many 
people actively working together to gather bucket after bucket of sap, collect wood, make a fire, 
and boil the sap for hours just to make a small amount of syrup, so too does learning require both 
sustained personal engagement—or in other words, the active exercise of individual agency15—
as well as working together as part of a coordinated community.16 Moreover, no two 
communities produce syrup that is identical in all respects. The flavor, consistency, texture, and 
so on, of different batches of syrup will depend on the weather, geography, boiling time, and so 
on, of different communities and their sugar bushes.  
 
This Anishinaabe epistemology corresponds to an Anishinaabe conception of truth. Basil 
Johnston explains that the Anishinaabemowin phrase, “w’daeb’awae” means “he or she is telling 
the truth, is correct, is right.”17 But the truth referred to in this phrase is not absolute; it is a 
qualified truth, one that is circumscribed by the speaker’s experience, perception, and command 
of language at that time.18 What one knows is a result of one’s own lived experience and active 
personal engagement, and so is always bounded by the limits of that experience. This conception 
helps to explain why an elder will so often say that she or he does not know much at all.19 Such 
statements are incongruous from within a western epistemology, according to which Anishinaabe 
elders are authorities on Anishinaabe traditions. But as Leanne Simpson explains, “you’ll always 
hear from our Elders what appears to be them ‘qualifying’ their teachings with statements that 
position them as learners, that position their ideas as their own understandings, and place their 
teachings within the context of their own lived experience.”20 Anishinaabe elders do not claim to 
                                                 
11 Lana Ray & Paul Nicholas Cormier, “Killing the Weendigo with Maple Syrup: Anishinaabe Pedagogy and Post-
Secondary Research” (2012) 35:1 Can J of Native Education 163 at 165, citing MJ Caduto & J Bruchac, Keepers of 
the Earth, Native Stories and Environmental Activities for Children (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1989) at 
145. 
12 Ray & Cormier, supra note 11 at 165. 
13 Ibid at 166-7. 
14 See Margaret Noori, “Beshaabiiag G’gikenmaaigowag: Comets of Knowledge” in Jill Doerfler, Niigaanwewidam 
James Sinclair & Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, eds, Centering Anishinaabeg Studies: Understanding the World 
through Stories (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013) 35 at 35 (explaining that “there is no noun for 
‘knowledge’ in the verb-based Anishinaabe language. In place of a single target word or definition, there are instead 
verbs bound with prefixes and suffixes indicating what is known and who is knowing.”). 
15 Ray & Cormier, supra note 11 at 165.  
16 Ibid at 170. 
17 Basil Johnston, “Is That All There Is? Tribal Literature” (Spring 1991) Can Literature 54 at 57. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Hadley Louise Friedland, The Wetiko (Windigo) Legal Principles: Responding to Harmful People in Cree, 
Anishinabek and Saulteaux Societies – Past, Present and Future Uses, with a Focus on Contemporary Violence and 
Child Victimization Concerns (LLM Thesis, University of Alberta, 2009) [unpublished] at 20. 
20 Leanne Simpson, “Land as pedagogy: Nishnaabeg intelligence and rebellious transformation” (2014) 3:3 
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1 at 11. 
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have tasted the syrup of every Anishinaabe community, and they do not purport to fill us, like 
empty vessels, with absolute truth, or in other words, to pour thick maple syrup directly into our 
mouths.   
 
3. Aadizookaanan and an Anishinaabe Constitutional Order 
 
The following three aadizookaanan, or stories, reflect an Anishinaabe constitutional 
order, which in turn give rise to Anishinaabe legal processes, which in turn give rise to 
Anishinaabe law. Our analyses of the first two stories highlight the tripartite framework of an 
Anishinaabe constitutional order. Our analysis of the third story identifies a key principle of 
Anishinaabe constitutionalism: the democratic principle. Insofar as Anishinaabe aadizookaanan 
reflect constitutional and legal principles, it may be tempting to treat them as analogous to 
Canadian judicial decisions. However, Anishinaabe aadizookaanan differ from judicial decisions 
in at least the following four ways. First, although aadizookaanan reflect constitutional and legal 
principles, they are not authorities for law in the way that judicial decisions are authorities for 
common law principles.21 That is, aadizookaanan are not the source of the law. Rather, the 
source may be some interaction within the natural world or the actions of community members 
which give rise to a consensus regarding the principle at issue.22  
 
Second, judicial decisions are meant to be fully comprehensible on a first reading, at least 
to those with the requisite training. Stories, in contrast, are often understood in a layered way. 
The different layers of meaning within a story can provide guidance that varies from person to 
person or even within the life of one and the same person, depending on his or her life 
experiences each time the story is heard. In other words, stories do not embody an objective, 
absolute truth; they require a listener or reader to be actively engaged in meaning-making. Our 
analysis of the following three stories reflects our understandings, based on our own experiences 
to date. In other words, by giving you our analysis of the following three stories, we are not 
purporting to pour thick maple syrup directly into your mouth.   
 
Third and most important, case law abstracts law from facts, intending that law should 
apply across all contexts. That is to say, case law—like all other sources of law in the common 
law tradition—presents law as rules: rights and reciprocal obligations standardized within a 
common citizenship. Aadizookaanan, on the contrary, present law as responsibilities: gifts and 
reciprocal needs that vary across distinct kinds of relationships. The law that lives in an 
Anishinaabe story is specific to its relational context; it cannot be disembedded, generalized, and 
transplanted elsewhere.  
 
Finally (and directly connected to the third point), judicial decisions require a narrow 
kind of reason which reflects a liberal conception of rationality: we are—at law at least—
primarily, thinking agents. Working effectively with case law requires finely honed critical and 
analytical thinking skills. Reasoning in the context of Anishinaabe law frequently makes 
                                                 
21 See Larry Chartrand, “Indigenizing the Legal Academy from a Decolonizing Perspective” (July 2015) Working 
Paper Series [unpublished] at 23. 
22 Ibid. 
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demands upon one’s whole self: body, mind, spirit, and heart. “Reasoning” has less to do with an 
anthropocentric form of rationality, and more to do with the provision of reasons. 
 
 
a) The Vision of Kitche Manitou23 
 
The following account is drawn from Basil Johnston’s version of “The Vision of Kitche 
Manitou”.24 It begins with a poem in which people ask elders: Who gave each creature his or her 
gift? For example, who gave the rose the gift of beauty? Who gave the bear the gift of a sense of 
timing? Who gave me my vision? 25 Finally, the narrator asks: 
 
Who gave to us 
The gifts we do not own 
But borrow and pass on?26  
 
Johnston then provides a prose account of the earth’s creation. Kitche Manitou, the Great 
Spirit, had a vision of all things. Kitche Manitou dreamt of a sky, sun, and moon, of mountains 
and forests, of flowers and vegetables, of crawling, flying, and swimming beings. Kitche 
Manitou also saw the birth and end of things, feeling wind and rain, and experiencing sadness 
and love. In these experiences Kitche Manitou realized that these experiences had to be brought 
into being. One by one, being by being, Kitche Manitou brought the world into existence. Out of 
nothing Kitche Manitou made rock, water, fire, and wind and gave each a unique power that 
became its soul-spirit.27 From these four substances, Kitche Manitou created the sun, stars, moon, 
and earth. From water, to wind, to air, from mountains, valleys, islands, and rivers, from plant 
beings to animal beings, Kitche Manitou gave each a unique power and nature. Last of all, 
Kitche Manitou created humankind.28 Humans were the least in the order of dependence, and 
weakest in bodily powers, but humanity had the greatest gift: the power to dream.29 Then, Kitche 
Manitou “made The Great Laws of Nature for the well being and harmony of all things and all 
creatures.”30 The Great Laws of Nature governed all of the activity of the natural world, 
including “the place and movement of sun, moon, earth and stars;…the powers of wind, water, 
fire, and rock;…the rhythm and continuity of lift, birth, growth, and decay.”31 Kitche Manitou’s 
vision was brought into existence.32 
 
 This story reflects the tripartite structure of Anishinaabe constitutionalism. The first 
constitutional feature revealed is the ontological condition of interdependence (as opposed to 
                                                 
23 Kitche Manitou means “Great Spirit”. For the Anishinaabe, Kitche Manitou is the Creator of all things and the 
Giver of Life.  
24 Basil Johnston, “The Vision of Kitche Manitou” in Basil Johnston, Ojibway Heritage: The Ceremonies, Rituals, 
Songs, Dances, Prayers and Legends of the Ojibway (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976) 11. 
25 Ibid at 11-12. 
26 Ibid at 12. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid at 13. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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individual autonomy in the liberal tradition). Humans are not dominant over the natural world. 
Humans are “last in the order of creation, least in the order of dependence, and weakest in bodily 
powers”.33 If all animals and plants ceased to exist, humans could not survive. Of all parts of the 
natural world, we are the most dependent. But our relationship with the rest of the natural world 
is more accurately described not merely as one of dependence, but of interdependence. We need 
each other, and this is why we were given gifts to pass on.   
 
The second constitutional feature pertains to our gifts: it is the relational logic of mutual 
aid (as opposed to contract and consent in the liberal tradition). Each being has its own gift. The 
gifts of the rose, the bear, humans, and others are described in the poem. Kitche Manitou 
conferred a special power and nature—or in other words, a gift—on each and every aspect of the 
natural world, including rocks, water, fire, and wind.  There is a legal word for this sacred gifting 
in Anishinaabemowin: we say “miinigowiziwin.”  It refers to the fact that Kitche Manitou has 
gifted all of creation with what we need to have a good life together.  As such, these are gifts “we 
do not own / But borrow and pass on.” In other words, our gifts are not ours to profit from; we 
are not to use them to benefit only ourselves. We pass them on; that is, we must give our gifts 
away.  In another of Basil Johnston’s stories, a boy named Southwind says to his grandmother, 
“No’okomiss, the flower gift that I received; it was really meant for you, wasn’t it?”34  She 
replies: “In a way it is. But it was meant for everybody. But that’s the way all human gifts are.”35  
It is the connection developed from the constant flow of gifts meeting one another’s needs that 
coordinates interaction and sustains community cohesion, not the formal and detached 
bindingness of a social contract. 
  
The third constitutional feature pertains to the ends towards which political community is 
oriented: harmony (as opposed to justice, in the liberal tradition). The natural world, in its natural 
state, is not chaotic and lawless. There is no state of nature in the sense of an original, disordered 
position from which we escape by entering into a social contract to create a civil society where 
we impose human-made laws on each other. On the contrary, all aspects of the natural world are 
already imbued with law—The Great Laws of Nature—and are ordered. These laws govern all 
aspects of the natural world, including human life. When these laws are followed, the result is 
harmony.  Importantly—and this is a critical distinction—“harmony” does not mean “non-
conflict”, but rather “non-disconnection”.  It is a state of shared openness to the gifts and needs 
of self and of other.   
 
b) The Great Law 
 
The following account of “The Great Law” is drawn from the version orated by Randy 
Councillor and recorded and revised by Art Przybilla.36 Rabbit usually ate a wide variety of 
plants and as a result did not overtax any one species of plant.37 But one summer the roses were 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Basil Johnston, “The Gift of the Stars / Anungoog Gauh Meenikooying” in The Gift of the Stars / Anangoog 
Meegiwaewinan (Cape Croker First Nation: Kegedonce Press, 2010) at 19. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Randy Councillor and Art Przybilla, “The Great Law” in Ojibwe Tales: Stories of the Ojibwe People 
(International Falls, MN: Lake States Interpretive Association, 2004) 27. 
37 Ibid. 
 8 
especially delicious, and so Rabbit ate nothing but roses. Roses eventually became scarce and as 
a result Bee was unable to make as much honey as usual. Bee did not know the cause of the rose 
shortage, and frequently lamented the problem to all of the other animals. The other animals lost 
patience with Bee’s complaints and ignored him.38  
 
Hummingbird, though, listened to Bee and to determine the extent of the issue, went on a 
search for roses. After searching widely but finding no roses, Hummingbird and Bee called a 
Great Council of all the animals.39 Even at the Great Council, the other animals did not listen to 
Bee, until Bear realized and explained that the lack of roses meant that he would not have 
enough honey for winter, and would have to eat some of the other animals instead. The other 
animals then became concerned that they might be eaten by Bear or, like Fox, have to compete 
with Bear for food.40  
 
The birds then flew to the four directions of the earth in search of roses. All were 
unsuccessful except Hummingbird who returned with a single half-dead Rose. The animals used 
all of their combined knowledge to nurse Rose back to health. When she was strong enough to 
talk, the animals asked what had happened and Rose explained that Rabbit had eaten all of the 
roses except for her. Bear was so angry that he yanked Rabbit by the ears, which then became 
stretched. Bear eventually tossed Rabbit into the angry crowd and told them to kill Rabbit. But 
Rose told them to stop.41 Rose explained that all of the animals were at fault—even Bear—as 
they failed to listen to Bee when Bee first told them about the issue. In fact, the animals had 
broken the greatest of all the Great Laws, namely, the one that “tells us that all living things must 
watch over all other living things and Mother Earth.”42 And so Rabbit’s ears remained stretched 
to remind all to listen, and roses received thorns to keep them safe from rabbits.43  
 
This story again illustrates the tripartite structure of Anishinaabe constitutionalism. 
However unlike the last story, this one identifies the three core constitutional features through 
the stacking errors of the animals in the story. It requires the reader to engage with it in a slightly 
different way, and to reason for oneself. It also introduces several Anishinaabe constitutional 
principles (which, recall, are not about rules, but rather how to orient oneself in relationship); we 
address only one of these here: the democratic principle. 
 
With respect to the first structural feature of Anishinaabe constitutionalism—
interdependence—each of the animals lost sight of the fact that it is in a relationship of 
interdependence with the others. Rabbit failed to appreciate how his eating all of the roses would 
affect Bee’s ability to make honey, which would affect Bear’s diet, which in turn would affect 
other animals who might then be eaten by Bear or have to compete with Bear for food. The other 
animals also failed to appreciate this interdependence when they ignored Bee’s initial complaints. 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid at 28. 
41 Ibid at 29 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid at 30. 
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With respect to the second structural feature of Anishinaabe constitutionalism—mutual 
aid—the majority of animals declined to render aid, opting out of the mutual aid framework 
which involves a cycle of (i) gifting, which generates (ii) gratitude, which in turn generates (iii) 
reciprocity, which then generates further (i) gifting, and so on. When the animals initially 
ignored Bee, they withheld their gifts—such as the birds’ ability to search for roses—which 
would have helped to meet the needs of all other animals. 
 
With respect to the third structural feature of Anishinaabe constitutionalism—harmony—
when the animals opt out of the mutual aid framework, closing themselves off from one another, 
the result is a sequence of calamity culminating in Rabbit’s ears getting stretched and Rabbit 
almost being killed. Harmony is finally restored when the animals are reminded of their 
responsibility to “watch over” each other, which they can fulfill by rendering mutual aid. 
Rabbit’s stretched ears serve as an ongoing reminder of this responsibility. In this way, the 
Anishinaabe constitutional order—including interdependence, mutual aid, and harmony—is 
encoded on the physiognomy of rabbits. 
 
This story also illustrates the democratic principle. Although we use the term ‘democratic 
principle’, we mean something closer to participatory democracy, as opposed to representational 
democracy. Once Bee and Hummingbird realized the extent of the problem, rather than try to 
address it by themselves, they called a Great Council of all the animals. Each animal used its 
unique gifts to contribute toward the solution. The birds flew in all directions to find signs of 
roses and when Rose was found half-dead, they all used their gifts to nurse Rose back to health. 
No animal was left out of the decision-making process.  
 
 
c) Beaver Gives a Feast  
 
The following account of “Beaver Gives a Feast” draws from the version recorded in F.G. 
Speck’s collection.44 Beaver was the Chief of the animals. From time to time, Beaver decided to 
give a feast to which he invited all of the other animals.45 Each time Beaver passed the food to 
his guests, he also passed wind. This sent silly Otter into hysterics. Other guests cautioned Otter: 
“You mustn’t laugh when Beaver does that; he is our chief.”46 But every time Beaver passed 
wind at one of his feasts, Otter would laugh. Finally, the animals told Otter that he must not 
attend the next feast. “You must not come; you never keep your mouth shut; you always 
laugh”,47 they explained. While Otter obliged, he told the others to ask Beaver to send him his 
share of the food in the size of Otter’s forearm. Otter has a very small forearm. The others agreed 
and attended the feast. Beaver noticed that Otter was not among his guests and asked, “Where, 
indeed, is Otter? I like him because he is so funny.” The people told Beaver that Otter did not 
come but asked Beaver to send him his share of food. Beaver cut a piece the size of Otter’s 
forearm and sent it back to Otter.48 
                                                 
44 FG Speck, “Beaver Gives a Feast” in FG Speck ed, Myths and Folk-lore of the Timiskaming Algonquin and 
Timagami Ojibwa (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1915) at 53.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid at 54. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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This story further illustrates the democratic principle, mentioned above, which is one 
principle that flows from the tripartite structure of an Anishinaabe constitutional order. Here, we 
see how authority works within Anishinaabe political community, namely, through persuasive 
compliance (as opposed to coercive authority, in the liberal tradition). Beaver is the leader, but 
he does not exercise coercive authority or use force in a top-down way, as a western sovereign 
does in the form of the executive branch of government. Instead, authority rests with the 
community members; it was the community members who told Otter to stay home and the 
evidence that they truly possess power is that even though Otter enjoyed the feasts, he complied 
with the direction from the community. The community members have not delegated their 
authority upward to Beaver, but rather retain it themselves. Power is diffuse, spread throughout 
the community, not concentrated in the position of the leader, whose role is rather that of 
facilitator and coordinator. Although Beaver enjoys Otter’s company, Beaver respects the 
community’s decision that Otter is not to attend the feasts. Beaver does not order Otter to attend 
or overrule the direction of the community. Instead, Beaver exercises persuasive leadership. He 
organizes and facilitates community gatherings, but does not impose his own will over them. It is 
Beaver’s ability to effectively coordinate interaction within the community—in part via the 
provision of gifts in the form of holding feasts, and in part because of his demeanour, as 
evidenced by his attitude to Otter, who laughs at him—that persuades others to heed his 
judgment. Despite being prohibited from attending the feasts, Otter’s need is not overlooked; the 
community brings him his share of food. Otter only asks for a small portion of food, presumably 
because that is all he needs. He does not take more than he needs. 
 
4. An Anishinaabe Constitutional Order 
 
To understand the significance of a constitutional order (whether Anishinaabe or 
otherwise), it is helpful to understand the relationship between a constitutional order and a 
society’s related institutions. Aaron Mills explains this relationship—in the context of both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous societies—using a tree model. The following account of Mills’s 
tree model of legality is reproduced with minor adaptations from his article entitled “The 
Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today”.49 
 
The roots of a society are its lifeworld: the story it tells of creation, which reveals what 
there is in the world (ontology) and how we can know (epistemology). Creation stories disclose 
what a person is, what a community is, and what freedom looks like. The trunk is a constitutional 
order: the structure generated by the roots, which organizes and manifests these understandings 
as political community. The branches are our legal traditions, the set of processes and institutions 
we engage to create, sustain, and unmake law. The trunk conditions the branches: it doesn’t 
determine what they’ll look like, but it powerfully shapes them. A constitutional order similarly 
settles which legal processes are legitimate within it, but without ever determining a necessary 
given set of processes as the legitimate ones. Subject to the conditions the trunk will support, 
legal processes and their institutions may vary considerably in object, scope, and means. Law, 
like leaves, experiences a still higher level of conditioning. It’s subject to the branches, which are 
                                                 
49 Mills, supra note 2 at 862-63. 
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subject to the trunk, which is subject to what the roots will bear. All are intimately connected but 
never so tightly as to eliminate difference.  
 
No two trees are the same even if they’re both white birch, the same age, and growing 
right next to one another. Similarly, while two Anishinaabe communities may have nearly 
identical constitutional structures, they will have laws that differ. Each level of legality within 
the lifeworld-law relationship is both empowered and constrained by the levels below. Every 
people is a tree. We tell different stories of creation (even those of us who don’t acknowledge 
doing so or who explicitly disclaim a view of creation) and the story we tell powerfully 
conditions the constitutional order we bring into being. For all societies, that constitutional order 
will shape legal processes and institutions, and thus ultimately what we count as law.50  
 
This isn’t quite the full image, however. Unlike Canada’s constitutional image of a 
“living tree”,51 no tree is actually freestanding. The roots are buried in and wrapped tightly 
against earth. The tree is grounded in something beyond itself. A “rooted” lifeworld doesn’t 
reflect the spontaneous ideas of those standing within it. Indigenous societies are all different and 
have unique creation stories.  But all are of something common: the earth beneath and all around 
us. What varies is how we understand it.  
 
********************************************** 
 
Our focus in this chapter is on the trunk, or in other words, the constitutional order. In a 
liberal democracy, the constitutional order is premised on the primacy of individual autonomy. 
Individuals exercise their autonomy when they enter into a contract (the social compact) in 
which they create rights and undertake obligations. The goal of entering into a political 
community is to achieve a state of justice, or in other words, a just state. 
 
In contrast, the ontological starting point of an Anishinaabe constitutional order is not 
individual autonomy, but interdependence. All members of the political community—which 
includes humans, animals, plants, earth and all other aspects of the natural world—are 
interdependent. Because of this interdependence, the political community sustains itself not 
through contract, but through mutual aid. Each member of the political community has a 
responsibility to coordinate the sharing of gifts with the needs of others within the political 
community. As we have said, the goal of political community is not justice, but harmony. If all 
members of the political community use their gifts to meet the needs of all others, then harmony 
                                                 
50 As Mills indicates in “Lifeworlds”, supra note 2 at 863, n 40, most law professors in Canada (and indeed entire 
legal movements: law and society, legal pluralism, comparative law, transsystemic law, and critical legal studies, 
amongst others) are committed to the general view that context is vital to legal analysis and to legal education, and 
in particular (1) that it’s critical for students to understand law as a function of legal process and of ideology, and (2) 
that power operates in various ways in the legitimation of one process (whether formal or informal) over another. 
That is, most of us understand that legal education must include the branches beneath the leaves. However, as Mills 
explains in “Lifeworlds”, the same cannot generally be said of the trunk and roots and I see this as a serious failing 
of Canadian legal education. 
51 See Edwards v Canada (Attorney General), [1930] AC 124 at 136, 1929 UKPC 86.  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can be achieved. Harmony does not refer to an absence of conflict; it refers to a web of 
relationships (interdependence) in which each member communicates gifts and needs. 
 
An Anishinaabe constitutional order can be illustrated as follows: 
 
  
 
 
5. Fact Scenario 
 
As you read the following fact scenario, consider how the Anishinaabe constitutional 
order discussed thus far would structure the response of the First Nation in the scenario.  We 
thought an example would be important, because unless the judicial branch of government is 
able to begin to understand and to identify Indigenous constitutionalism at work, it will continue 
to (mis)read Indigenous patterns of reason, argumentation, and action (i.e. law) from a Canadian 
constitutional standpoint, and thus as confused, civilly disobedient, or illegal.  In the era of 
reconciliation, continuing in this way seems difficult to justify.52   
 
Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation is an Anishinaabe community located in Northwestern 
Ontario and a signatory to the Robinson Superior Treaty. Like many other First Nations across 
Canada, the members of Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation did not speak or read English in 
1850 when they signed the Robinson Superior Treaty.  
 
A substantial deposit of chromite has been discovered within Animikii-wiikwedong First 
Nation’s traditional territory, but outside of its reserve. A mining company called Rocky Bay 
Mining Inc. (Rocky Bay) has staked a number of claims in this area, and now it wants to start the 
extraction process.  
                                                 
52 Having offered this challenge, we acknowledge just how complicated taking it up is.  One of the most challenging 
realities here is that often Indigenous communities don’t act in strict compliance with their own constitutional 
orders; by 2017, results are not so neat and tidy.  Frequently Indigenous individuals and communities bring elements 
of their own constitutional order into an argument or action which endeavours to be attentive also to Canadian law 
and constitutional assumptions.  And this is exactly what should be expected: Indigenous peoples have been living 
under the imposition of Canadian constitutionalism for generations now and, as best they are able, have developed 
survival strategies.  But in the final analysis, this complexity should not be a barrier to learning as best one can. The 
alternative is the continued tacit acceptance of colonialism’s greatest imposition: the overwriting of existing 
Indigenous constitutionalisms by Canada’s.   
Interdependence
Mutual Aid
(Gift/Need-
Gratitude-
Reciprocity)
Harmony
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According to the case law on section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Crown has a 
duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples whenever it contemplates action that will have an 
adverse impact on Aboriginal or treaty rights, and also provide accommodation in some 
circumstances. The case law also establishes that Indigenous laws should inform the 
interpretation of section 35(1). Ontario tells Rocky Bay that Rocky Bay must fulfill the duty to 
consult before Ontario will grant it an extraction permit. 
 
Rocky Bay held a consultation session at Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation’s 
community centre on August 9, 2016. The Rocky Bay representatives gave a PowerPoint 
presentation outlining their proposed extraction plan, including the effects it would have on the 
land. They explained that Rocky Bay plans to use an open pit mining system that will cover an 
area of approximately three square kilometers. Using the open pit system means that everything 
in those three square kilometers, including animals, trees, shrubs, rocks, earth and of course 
chromite, will be removed. The mine is expected to operate for eighty years, after which Rocky 
Bay will remediate the site. Rocky Bay also proposes to build a road to access the open pit. 
 
After the presentation, Rocky Bay asked Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation for feedback 
by September 20, 2016 so that it could address any concerns and get government approval by the 
end of the year. Rocky Bay needs to start construction on the mine by February 2017 in order to 
make the operation economically viable.   
 
The next month, Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation sent a letter to Rocky Bay in 
response to its presentation. About the access road, Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation explained 
that the proposed route goes directly through a grove of maple trees, but that if the road were 
moved about 200 metres so that it avoids the maple trees, it would be fine. About the mine itself, 
representatives of Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation stated that they have a number of concerns. 
To name just one, they noted that the location of the proposed pit would be directly within the 
feeding ground for deer. They asked whether the pit could be reduced to 1/5 of the proposed size, 
so as to preserve the feeding ground. Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation also explained that they 
need more time before they can articulate their full response. Many members of the Animikii-
wiikwedong First Nation live off of the reserve, in various towns and cities throughout Canada. 
Most, though, return to the reserve during the summer, and so Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation 
proposes that it can respond to Rocky Bay’s proposals by the end of the summer of 2017.  
 
Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation received the following response from Rocky Bay: 
 
 
Rocky Bay Mining Inc. 
124 Main Street 
Thunder Bay, ON P8W 0K3 
 
October 1, 2016 
 
Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation  
P.O. Box 132  
P3E 6A5 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Dear Chief and Council, 
 
We thank you for your correspondence dated September 20, 2016. We 
believe that we can fully accommodate all of your concerns. 
 
First, we understand your concerns about the destruction of the maple trees. 
Unfortunately, though, it will not be practical to re-route the access road. Our 
feasibility study showed that the most cost-efficient route for the access road is 
the one proposed and outlined during our presentation. Moving the route, even 
by 200 metres, would mean having to blast through the Canadian shield, 
which would add several hundreds of thousands of dollars to the cost of our 
project. However, we are very pleased to offer you another solution: we will 
ship 50 litres of maple syrup from the Metro grocery store in Thunder Bay to 
your community each year during the eighty year life of the mine. This solution 
has the benefit of both ensuring an adequate supply of maple syrup and also 
being cost efficient. 
 
Second, we would like to address your concerns about the size of the pit. This 
size was chosen because a pit of this size will provide the maximum profits in 
the light of the expenses required to operate the pit. This was our criterion 
when determining the size of the pit because we are obligated to uphold our 
duty to our shareholders to maximize profits. To compensate for the loss of 
deer as a result of the pit, we would like to negotiate a monetary payment to 
be provided to you, as well as a to-be-agreed upon number of jobs at the mine 
to be reserved for members of your community.    
 
Third, we appreciate your desire to consult with your off-reserve members, but 
we regret that it would not be feasible for us to wait until the end of next 
summer for a full response from you. We would lose tens of thousands of 
dollars for each day that this project is delayed beyond February 2017. 
Fortunately, we have a solution: we have been advised that this type of 
decision is within the jurisdiction of Chief and Council under the Indian Act. It is 
not necessary to put this to a vote of the entire community; Chief and Council 
have the authority to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with us on 
this issue. 
 
We hope that we have satisfactorily addressed your concerns and that we can 
now move on to negotiating the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU). Attached is a draft MoU setting out the terms proposed above (50 litres 
of maple syrup per year, monetary payment, guaranteed jobs). We look 
forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.  
 
Yours truly, 
Rocky Bay Mining Inc. 
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6. Analysis: How does an Anishinaabe constitutional order inform 
Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation’s decision-making process about the 
mining company’s proposal?  
 
6.1 Considering the Structure of Anishinaabe Constitutionalism 
 
a) Interdependence  
 
All three stories discussed above illustrate the principle of interdependence. In “The 
Great Law”, all beings are dependent upon one another for their survival. The nature of the 
connection of the members of the community is need. The decision of Rabbit to eat all the roses, 
and the decision by the animals to ignore Bee’s concerns, led to the needs of all animals not 
being met. Bee could not make honey, Bear could not rely on Bee’s honey, Fox would now have 
to compete with Bear for smaller animals, and smaller animals were in danger of being eaten by 
Bear. Similarly, in “Beaver Gives a Feast”, everyone recognizes that although Otter is excluded 
from the feast, he still has a need for food. Finally, the “Vision of Kitche Manitou” reveals that 
humans were created last and are dependent on the natural world to survive.   
 
Similarly, the members of Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation are in a relationship of 
interdependence with the maple trees and the deer. The maple trees and the deer are neither 
chattels nor fixtures on the land; they are not property of any kind. As such, they are not 
resources or objects. Instead, the maple trees and the deer are members of a political community 
that has a relationship with Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation. The maple trees, the deer, and 
members of Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation each have gifts that can meet the needs of the 
others. Financial compensation not only fails to meet the broader needs at issue; it is destructive 
of the existing mutual aid relationships. Some of Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation’s gifts 
include the ability to protect the maple trees and the deer from being destroyed by those who 
have no relationship with them and who would reduce them to externalities that can be replaced 
with commodified versions of their gifts.  
 
There is an additional way in which members of Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation are 
dependent on the maple trees and the deer, as well as on the animals, trees, shrubs, earth, and 
rocks that would be removed in order to dig the pit. Recall that in “The Vision of Kitche 
Manitou”, Kitche Manitou imbued all aspects of the natural world with law—namely, with The 
Great Laws of Nature. As a result, the natural world is a source of Anishinaabe law. Similarly, in 
“The Great Law”, an Anishinaabe constitutional order is embedded within rabbit’s physiognomy. 
If the maple grove, the deer, the rocks and so on are destroyed, so too will be important aspects 
of the legal archive of Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation. They will lose the source of some of 
their law, and in time they will also lose the law itself.      
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b) Mutual Aid (Needs & Gifts) 
 
Mutual aid is the means by which a political community is organized and constituted in 
accordance with an Anishinaabe constitutional order. This is accomplished through identifying 
and coordinating the gifts of some with the needs of others. When one receives a gift, one feels 
gratitude for having his or her needs taken care of, and this gratitude moves us to reciprocity. As 
we have seen, though, reciprocity will just as often mean paying the gift forward. In “The Great 
Law”, Bee had the gift to make honey and Bear had the need for honey in order to survive. The 
animals were told to use their gifts to look after one another, and the decision of one community 
member affected all other community members. In “Beaver Gives a Feast”, Otter has a need for 
food met by the gift that Beaver has to provide the food, and for a sense of belonging: Otter’s 
mandated absence from the feast had to be managed so as not to appear as a removal from the 
governance function of the community.  
 
If Rocky Bay wants to operate with the consent of Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation in 
its traditional territory, it will need to find a way to enter into political community with Animikii-
wiikwedong First Nation. It can do this by identifying the needs of Animikii-wiikwedong First 
Nation and then offering the gifts it has to share that would meet those needs. At this point, 
Rocky Bay has identified some gifts that it can offer—maple syrup, jobs, and a monetary 
payment—but it is not clear that each of those gifts accurately corresponds to a need of 
Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation. More complicated still is how Rocky Bay’s offer impacts 
other members of the community: because maple trees are members of the political community 
and not property or a mere resource for making syrup, the offered gift of maple syrup does not 
adequately meet Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation’s need to fulfill its responsibility to meet the 
needs of the maple trees as members of its political community. Rocky Bay has demonstrated no 
understanding of Anishinaabe constitutional order. It has appealed to Animikii-wiikwedong First 
Nation’s self-interest, short-circuiting the logic of mutual aid, which is the very heart of 
Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation’s political community.   
 
c) Harmony 
 
To achieve harmony, each member of the political community must engage in the 
practices of mutual aid previously described. Disharmony results from the closing off of 
someone taking more than he or she needs. In “The Great Law”, harmony is impeded when 
Rabbit is unable to curb his appetite for Roses and thus takes more than he needs. In “Beaver 
Gives a Feast”, Otter only asks for a small amount of food because that is all he needs. 
 
With respect to the size of the mine, the Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation is concerned 
with taking only what is needed. After considering the needs of the maple trees and the feeding 
ground for the deer, the Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation concludes that the mine should be 
reduced to 1/5 of the proposed size. In contrast, Rocky Bay’s determinant for an appropriate 
sized mine was maximizing shareholder profits. These two determinants not only fail to align, 
but pull against one another. 
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6.2 Applying Anishinaabe Constitutional Principles 
 
 As discussed above in section 4, a constitutional order (which corresponds to the trunk in 
the tree model of legality) establishes conditions of legitimacy for a political community’s legal 
institutions and processes (which correspond to the branches), without dictating the exact form 
those legal institutions and processes must take. The stories discussed above illustrate not only 
principles pertaining to an Anishinaabe constitutional order but also principles pertaining to 
Anishinaabe legal institutions and processes, which are applied to the fact scenario in the section 
below. 
 
 
a) Democratic Principle 
 
According to the democratic principle, all members of a political community participate 
in community governance. The “Vision of Kitche Manitou” illustrates that all aspects of the 
natural world have a soul-spirit, and thus have agency. As such, all aspects of the natural world 
are members of our political community who should have a voice in decisions which impact 
them. In “Beaver Gives a Feast”, authority was vested in and exercised by the people, not Beaver. 
Beaver respected the authority of the people and did not question why Otter was excluded from 
the feast. In “The Great Law”, when Bee and Hummingbird recognized the extent of the problem, 
they called a Great Council which was a meeting of all the animals. Bee and Hummingbird did 
not make unilateral decisions without input from the other animals. The animals collectively took 
responsibility for determining why the roses had disappeared. Each animal exercised authority 
regarding community governance equally. This story illustrates the negative consequences of 
ignoring the voice and authority of other members of the political community. When Bee began 
complaining about the roses disappearing, no one listened to his concerns. By ignoring Bee’s 
voice, the others exacerbated the problem of the disappearing roses. 
 
Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation has a responsibility to consult with all community 
members affected by the proposed action, including the maple trees and the deer, as well as all of 
the animals, trees, shrubs, earth, and rocks that will be removed in order to dig the open pit of the 
mine. Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation also needs more time to consult with their off reserve 
members. However, Rocky Bay wants Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation’s Chief and Council to 
make a unilateral decision, based on the authority granted to Chief and Council under the Indian 
Act. This request by Rocky Bay directly contravenes the principle that authority rests in the 
community who is responsible for decision-making that affects community governance. 
Decisions are not to be made by leaders, as in a representational democracy where those who are 
elected have authority to make decisions within specified areas of jurisdiction without holding a 
referendum about each decision.  
  
7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter does not document Anishinaabe law, which corresponds to the leaves and 
needles within the tree model of legality. To offer a conclusion about what the result of the 
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dialogue between Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation and Rocky Bay might be, we would have to 
engage in a detailed legal analysis.  Instead, our focus has been on the roots (epistemology), the 
trunk (constitutional order), and to a lesser extent, the branches (legal institutions and processes). 
Just as the roots, trunk, and branches condition a tree’s leaves and needles, so too does a political 
community’s epistemology and ontology, constitutional order, and legal institutions and 
processes condition its laws. Thus, to understand Anishinaabe law, one must first understand 
Anishinaabe epistemology and ontology, constitutional order, and legal tradition (institutions and 
processes). This is a tall order—and one which Indigenous peoples are not asked but expected to 
meet every time they engage one of Canada’s legal or administrative processes. For this reason, 
our analysis of the fact scenario did not purport to determine the specific outcome of whether the 
mine would proceed. Instead, we illustrated the differences in the approach an Anishinaabe 
community might take in generating such a position. Animikii-wiikwedong First Nation’s 
approach was based on the view that they are part of an interdependent web of relationships in 
which all members of the community use their gifts to contribute toward meeting the needs of 
other community members. If each member fulfills this responsibility, the result is harmony.    
 
